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• 
TRILATERALISM AND THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM: 
.AN EFFORT AT MANAGING THE ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE 
·By Prexy Nesbitt* 
,What we have achieved is a masterpeice as a politico-
diplomatic exercise. No one ever believed that we could 
get the internal leaders to agree to so much •.. whereas 
we were alone, we now have the advantage of authentic black 
nationalists defending our political position ... ** 
·The 1978 "Zimbabwe Rhodesia"*** ·constitution and subse-
quent elections of April 1979 can be interpreted in light 
of trilaterialist principles. The constitution and elections 
'* Prexy Nesbitt is Research Secretary for the World Council of 
Churches Program to Combat Racism. He was previously Director 
of the Africa Project of the Washington, D.C. Insti t ute for 
Policy Studies. For two years he was the Associate Director 
of the American Committee on Africa. He. has lived, worked, 
and studied in the Southern African region for over 4 1/2 years 
beginning in 1965. (The views expressed are the author 1 s own. J 
**Co-Minister of Defense Picker K. Van de Byl speaking to an 
all white, closed door audience when Muzorewa first began to 
cooperate with Ian Smith's government. The Times (London) 
May 8, 1978, quoted in Nazir Ahmad, Abel Muzorewa: An Auto-
biography, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 
paper, 1979. 
***ed. note: "Zimbabwe Rhodesia''. is the name given the country 
under the constitution approved by the white settlers. Zimbabwe 
is the African name - the name for a situation of true indepen-
dence and majority rule. "Rhodesia" is the colonial name, after 
Cecil Rhodes, who led the first plundering expedition which claimed 
the area for the British Crown; he became the colony's first 
administrator. In this paper, Rhodesia is used in reference to 
the settler regime, especially the military apparatus. Zimbabwe 
signifies the African majority. Zimbabwe Rhodesia is used 
where appropriate in reference to the Muzorewa/Smith government. 
Written for: Trilateralism: Elite Planning for World Management, 
ed. Holly Sklar. Forthcoming, South End Press, 
Boston, Winter, 1980. 
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are not the creations of White Rhodesia alone. They are 
the result, also, of two historic initiatives by the West: 
first, joint efforts by Britain, and the United States culmina-
ting in the 1977 Anglo-American plan for Zimbabwe and, 
. 
second, collaboration on Namibia between the U.S., Britain, 
France, West Germany and Canada (the so-called Contact Group), 
also beginning in 1977. These initiatives are part of a larger 
set of events which includes: the August 1977 African journey 
o f then British Foreign Minister David Owen and then U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young; the February 
1978 trip of Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and 
Robert Mugabe to Malta for talks with U.S. and British offi-
cials,; and the 1978 meeting of trilateralists Carter, Vance, 
Mondale, and Brzezinski with South African Foreign Minister 
Botha. A host of politicians and private organizations in 
. . 
the U.S. and Britain -- ranging from the British Anglo-
Rhodesia Society to North Carolina Congressman Jesse Helm's 
tax-exempt foundation to the Institute of Aaerican Relations 
a n d the Center for a Free Society -- have also had a hand in 
shaping the so-called Internal Settlement. In short to under-
stand events im Zimbabwe one cannot look within Zimbabwe alone. 
2 
The Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution and elections are the 
basis for an illusory (i.e. having the appearance of majority rule) 
neo-colonial structure which would serve as an alternative to a 
sei~ure of state power by a genuine national liberation movement: 
the Patriotic Front (PF), consisting of the Zimbabwe 
• 
3 
African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU). Like the white settlers, trilateralists 
seek to avoid an "excess of democracy" in Zimbabwe. However, 
the·· ·newly elected Prime Minister, the diminutive Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa, and his white settler dominated Cabinet represent i. 1. 
only a modified application of the trilateral method to the 
Southern African scene. The constitution and elections were 
too !plainly cosmetic. They were broadly perceived as 
resulting in the same white structure with black faces (Zirn-
babweans have called Muzorewa a "blacksmith".) Because ---
the elections of April 17-21 were judged 'neither free nor fair' 
and because the "new" constitution maintains the white settler 
community's economic and political hegemony, the hoped for 
lifting of sanctions by the international community did not 
follow. 
Furthermore, the elections to "bring peace" to Zimbabwe 
have neither ended the war not renewed the ragged economy. 
On the contrary since the elections the· escalating war has 
strained the economy even further. The Washington p·ost 
reported on September 30, 1979 that Zimbabwe Rhodesia's war 
effortwascosting $1.6 million daily. And the Salisbury 
based correspondent for Th~ Economi·st reported shortly after 
the elections that it was the war-related problems -- the 
transport bottleneck, balance of payments problem, shortage of 
skilled labor~- that were creating a stagnant economy, not 
application of sanctions by an equivocating international 
• 
community. "So long as the war continues -- and escalates," 
he wrote, "the capacity for increased production simply does 
not exist. 111 
There has been an accelerated call-up for military service 
to bring the number of Rhodesian soldiers to over 100,000, an 
increasing proportion of them being Blacks.* On the other 
side, by September 1979 there were 30% more Patriotic Front 
guerillas operating inside the country than had been the case 
4 
only six months earlier. The PF guerillas have succeeded in 
bringing large tracts of land under their administrative control --
penetrated only intermittently by large Augusta-Bell helicopters 
-- and have carried out successful operations in Salisbury, 
the capital. Some 2,000 of Rhodesia's 6,100 white farms 
2 have been abandoned: whole communities have disappeared. 
The period around the election itself witnessed high monthly 
death tolls of 800 to 900 people and by~-Au<just 1979 that figure 
\vould cli mb to over 1,000. At the same time some 1,000 or so 
whites were emigrating monthly.** 
There is an additional by-product from the war. The 
PF guerillas have succeeded in paralyzing the international 
business community. Foreign capital is watching as closely 
as the PF, the telling statistics of white emigration, gross 
*According to the Salisbury regime's Central Statistical Office, 
as of April 1977, the total white population is 273,000. Blacks 
number - 6, 340 -, 000. -As quoted in International Defence and Aid 
Fund, · ·zimbabwe: Th·e· F·ac·ts About· Rhodesia (London, November 1979). 
**The irrmr1·g·r ·ati·on figures are consistently exaggerated by the 
Rhodesian Government in an attempt to retain what foreign 
capital remains. Official figures state that since January 1979 
the country lost 9,973 whites for the 2,268 whites who immigrated. 
· (The ·st·ar, Johannesburg, October 6, 1979.) 
• 
I 
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domestic product and foreign exchange. A recent report of 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council assessed the 
, 
over-all situation in Rhodesia: 
Many foreign interests are reportedly prepared to 
expand their operations once the political situation 
stabilizes. For the moment, however, very little 
investment activity, foreign or local, is taking 
place. During the past year, almost no new foreign 
capital has been invested in the once dependable 
mining sector and th3 search for new minerals has practically stopped. 
The Muzorewa solution has failed to achieve a central 
objective of trilateralism in Africa: managing or at least 
stemming the ad.vance of the radical liberation forces and, 
Henry Kissinger's words, "preventing the radicalization" 
of the situation.* 
• in 
In the sections below we shall discuss the following: 
the political/military background to the April 1979 election; 
foreign capital interests in Rhodesia; the elections and the 
*Because of its importance a fuller statement of Kissinger's 
t e stimony before the House of Representatives, International 
Re lations Committee Hearings, (June 17, 1976) follows: 
With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure 
was building on Rhodesia, regarded by the Africans as 
the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Angola 
encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in 
Rhodesia. 
With radical influence on the rise, and with immense 
outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, 
even moderate and responsible African leaders -- firm 
proponents of peaceful change -- began to conclude there 
was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence. 
By March of this year, guerilla actions took on even 
larger dimensions. We sa~ ahead the prospect of war fed 
and perhaps conducted by outside forces; we were concerned 
about a continent politically and economically estranged 
from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization 
which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe 
and Jap an. (p. 8). 
• 
Muzorewa government; the ramifications of the Carter/Young 
policy toward Rhodesia upon domestic politics, with a special 
1 ' focus on the gr©Wing role of Black Americans; and the general 
strategy of trilateralisrn toward Southern African liberations 
movements, as applied to the specific case of Zimbabwe . 
Bac kgrbund· to the April Elections 
6 
On September 15, 1978, in a speech delivered in Maputo 
President Samora Machel of Mozambique lamented: the Front Line 
States* and Africa as a whole had allowed British and U.S. envoys 
to deceive the Front Line Presidents; the latter had accepted 
the intentions of the West as being one with those of Black 
Africa in seeking to terminate the illegal Smith regime. (A 
white minority government led by Ian Smith defied calls for 
majority rule by unilaterally declaring independence from 
Britain in 1965.) Even from the perspective of imperialism, 
Machel pointed out, apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in 
Namibia, and settler rule in Zimbabwe were all anachronisms. 
Continuing his analysis (perhaps addressing himself to certain 
of his Front Line colleagues), he observed: 
Our candour and the sincerity with which the Front Line 
states tried to advise the British and the Americans, 
enabled imperialism to improve its strategy, enabled 
imperialism to maneuver so that, till now, it has managed 
*The five 'Front Line States' are: Tanzania, Botswana, Angola, 
Mozambique and Zambia. At the 1979 meeting 6 f the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), the Front Line States were once again 
endorsed to speak for and act on behalf of the entire OAU. 
I 
, 
to maintain the illegal Smith regime. 
The main objective of the -imperialist-- action is 
not to- overthrow -Smith. - ·The--·mai·n -·objec·tive· ·of· :i ·m:p·e:ri·a1·ism 
is t ,o 'des·troy 'the 'l "ibera'ti'on' 'rrjoverrient, _to destr0y any 
form of organization which enables the people to liberate 
themselves. 
Imperialist strategy has been, after all, extremely 
coherent. 
Imperialism has two operational detachments in Zimbabwe: 
7 
Smith and his lackeys and-- Great--Britain-- and -- its partners. 
The-- operati·ona·1 -st·r ·at·egy·- is· . .-a·1ways· ·to h·a·ve·- ·r ·e·a·d·y· two 
·solu't ·i'on·s·: ·a·n· 'int·er·nal s·o1·u·ti·on· ·a·n·d an i ·n:t·erna·ti·o11·a·1· s ·olution. 
When one of the alternatives is about to reach a 
solution to the problem, imperialism sets in motion the 
other alternative.4(emphasis ed.) 
There is a long history of meetings, conferences, and 
agreements which substantiates President Machel's contention 
that imperialism always keeps these two solutions at the ready, 
with the main objective being to nreve nb the Zimbabwean liberation 
movement from gaining power. Beginning with the talks between 
Smith and Prime Minister Harold Wilson aboard the H.M.S. Tiger --
held one year after Smith's unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence in 1965 -- and extending to the Fall 1979 talks at Lancaster 
House in London (taking place as this article is being written), 
here have been repeated Western efforts at negotiating a solution 
to t he Rhodesian problem. At times talks have been bilateral, 
brie f, informal, or secret, as when on August 2, . 1977 Andrew 
Young had a chance meeting with Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua 
Nkomo in Guyana and followed it up with a trip by Nkomo to 
Washington and New York. At other times, such as in the October 
1976 Geneva Conference, talks have been formal, extensive and 
involved all of the various parties, including the Front Line 
• 
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States, with the support of the United Nations. 
' , 
For the Patriotic Front and its African supporters --
especially the Front Line States and, increasingly, Nigeria* --
the talks and conferences are largely tactical. That is, they 
r are modalities which should assist in transforming the status 
quo. What President Samora Machel said in a 1978 speech to 
members of the United Nations in Maputo could just as well 
have been expressed by the leadership of ZANU or ZAPU. Speaking 
to the audience which included both a U.S. and a British delega-
tion, Machel remarked: 
We totally reject the idea that the path of armed 
struggle and the path of negotiations are either 
mutually-exclusive alternatives or contradictions in 
the process of national liberation. We do not love 
war but we believe that, when the contradiction is 
antagonistic and insoluble, only war makes peace. 
Our people have a saying for this: 'you can't make 
tea without boiling the water.' 
Talks are an important factor for victory but they 
are not the decisive factor. 
For Smith (and more recently for his "successor"/collaborator 
Muzorewa) the talks and conferences, whether secret or open, 
are means to try and pr·eserve· the exist·ing ·status q·uo ·situa·t ·ion. 
*Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Australia were the countries which 
pressured Britain into convening the Lancaster House Conference .i n 197~ 
Nigeria's takeover of British Petroleum just before the August 
Commonwealth Conference was one more instance of Nigeria exerting 
its muscle and showing its growing power as one of the "new in-
fluentials." See Carolyn Anderson Brown's article for further 
discussion of Nigeria. 
• 
• 
To date, Smith and his colleagues have refused to consider 
the means of genuine transference of power and the dismantling 
of the mechanisms by which 273,000 , whites exploit 6340,000 
Blacks. Rather, they have attempted ·. to use the talks 
and (abortive) agreements as part of a strategy to split the 
Pi"Ft. d . d .. : an impe e any growing momentum, diplomatic or military, 
which the PF might be enjoying at a particular time. 
For the trilateralist West, particularly the United States 
(though by tacit agreementBri..ta:i:n, because of its 'responsibility 
as the colonial power.' is ·usually the central actor*) ·; the 
meetings and talks up to and including Lancaster House 1979 
signify a process of management. Trilateral leaders would be 
the first to say that the status quo situation of wnite settler 
hegemony has to be altered. But other experiences in Southern 
Africa, especially in Angola, and throughout the Third World, 
have taught them that the key problem is one of shaping the 
9 
nature of change, i.e. avoiding at all costs "chaos" (revolutionary 
change) . On July 3, 1979, Henry K-issi nger was asked about his 
plan for Rhodesia when serving as Secretary of State. He 
responded: "My plan was to co-ont the program of moderate evolu-
tionary reform, that is to say majority rule and minority rights." 
(Wasington Post). Speaking from the same posture of managing, 
Andrew Young an swered a question about U.S. involvement in 
Africa. by saving: 
*According to the London Observer of October 21, 1978, this is 
true only as long as the British are adequate to the task. At 
the point at which the Lancaster Ho.use Conference a·lmost collapsed 
over the issue of whether a new government should assume the costs 
of compensating departing white settlers for the ir land, it was 
a secret intervention - reportedly at the request of President 
Nyerere of Tanzania and Shridrath Ramphal, the Commonwealth 
secretary - by Carter and Vance promising the funds that salvaged 
.. 
I don't think you can blame us for that [the fact that 
the war was still going on in Zimbabwe]. See we were in 
a supportive role ·-- supporting Africa and Britain, in 
trying to find a political an~wer to the problem, and I 
think we have rema.ined true t o that. But other changes 
have come about that we were not in control of. 5 
10 
It is important to note one fundamental difference between the 
Kissinger approach and the Carter/Young approach. The latter 
seems to be much more trilateralist. Whereas Kissinger maintains 
that the best thing to do with the radical nationalists (what 
he calls the "ideological radicals," a category into which he 
places ~1ugabe but not Nkomo) · is to i ·solate them, Young and Carter feel 
that it is best to maximize contact in the belief that the radical 
nationalists ultimately "want to share in the productivity of 
the American way of life.''* 
*(continued from previous page): the Conference. I suspect 
the Carter administration did not require much prodding to proffer 
the funds -- part of a multi-donor program. In fact~1 such assis-
tance was planned under the Zimbabwe Development Fund envisaged 
by Kissinger in 1976. To say that the funding was being done 
at the request of the African parties just provides better cover 
for the managerial initiat~ves. 
*The anecdotal pastor Young illustrated this point beautifully 
in a recent speech to the Houston Texas Trade Association: 
I remember when we sat down with the Patriotic Front when 
they agreed to elections run by the British and supervised by 
the United Nations -- something which Ian Smith and Bishop 
Muzorewa never would agree to -- one of the things that happened 
was a big, burly guy comes over to me and put his hand on my 
shoulder and said, 'I need to talk to you. ' I didn't know him. 
As big as he was I was kind of nervous. He pulled me off to 
the corner. He was in his battle fatigues, long bearded. 
He was supposedly one of their military commanders from out 
in the bush. He pulled me off to ,the side and saiq, 'What 
really happened to the Oakland Raiders?" I said 'what do you 
mean?' He said, "They were supposed to be Super Bowl this year, 
what happened?' (Remarks by Andrew Young, Houston Trade 
Association, May 18, 1979). Reprint available from United 
States Mission to the United Nations, New York City. 
, 
But differences aside, there is a consensus on one key 
point regard.ing Rhodesia:. the neea. t o aainta in the interests 
of the multinational corporations operatin~ there in ·the" face 
of the growing military threat fro~ the PFs fighting forces. 
How great is that threat? Is there anyp:>ssibility that the 
Patriotic Front will take po,~,er through a military victory? 
The thirteen years of war have been a bitter and cruel 
affair. The strategy used by the Rhodesian Forces -- similar 
to that of the U.S. forces in Vietnam -- is to terrorize the 
civilian population away from the support they have consistently 
given the guerillas, whom they fondly call "the Boys."* Some 
indication of the extent to which this type of counter insur-
gency has failed is provided by the fact that the Patriotic 
11 
Front has today a pool of close to half a million refugees in 
the·n~rghborl~gcountries of Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana 
from which to draw political cadre and military recruits. 
Likewise, the fact that South Africa is assuming an in-
creasingly overt role in the war is a direct indication of the 
Front's effectiveness. It has been known and reported for 
some time that South Africa is materially involved in the war 
in Zimbabwe, just as it has intervened in Angola and Mozambigue. 
South Africa continues to wage a war of agression against Angola, 
both directly and through its extensive support of UNITA. South 
Africa has aided Rhodesia with equipment (in February 1979, for 
instance, South Africa supplied Rhodesia with Mirage jets for 
its attack upon ZAPU camps in Angola), $50 million in monthly 
*Please note: when this term is affectionately used by Zimbabweans, 
they are making reference to both men and women in the Patriotic 
Front's fighting forces. 
12 
6 bank loans and with personnel. But the South African military 
is worried that Muzorewa's forces are outnumbered and out-
experienced by the guerillas. A spokesman stated, ''I don't 
, 
see how they'll [Muzorewa forces] win unless they get more 
manpower." On September 24, 1979 Prime Minister Botha told 
a Capetown National Party meeting: 
We have an interest in the stability north of us. 
If confusion and chaos are created for Rhodesia 
by outside forces, I want to warn that the South African 
parliament will have to consider what steps we :are going 
to take because we do not want and we cannot afford confusion 
on our borders.* 
A month later, on October 22, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda 
alluded to one of South Africa's "steps" to preserve "stability", 
when he told a visiting Iraqui delegation how Z:ambian forces 
were (thus far) "containing" some 1000 Rhodesian and South 
African troops operating in Zambian territory. 7 
South Africa is, indeed, very concerned about their "kith 
and kin" to the north; but their concern is not altruistic. 
Roodesia • is, as the International Defense and Aid Fund describes 
it, a "sixth province of South Africa." There will be more and 
more troop commitment and escalated intervention by South Africa 
in Rhodesia because: 
*Cited in 1. the w·ashi·ngton p·ost, September 29, 1979. Another aspect 
of the confusion Botha may have been alluding to is the growing 
morale problem with Rhodesian security forces. The Lorldon 
Guardian (August 29, 1979) pointed to an increasingly bitter 
internecine quarrel when it headlined a story that the most 
effective Rhodes .ian counter-insurgency force, the Selous Scouts, 
were preparing "to resign and leave Rhodesia." 
Political and business confidence in South Africa is 
inttmately bound up with the survival of Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa. Whether South Africa sets itself on a path 
of even moderate economic growth is now probably more 
dependent on what happens at Lancaster House in the 
next few months than on any other single factor. 11 8 
Foreign capital is also assuming a more active profile in 
Rhodesia. The present Rhodesian economy is the product of 
• 
Western capital, South African capital, and, to a lesser extent, 
of white settler farmers. From the moment Cecil Rhodes first 
planted his feet on Zimbabwean soil in 1890, Rhodesia has been 
a "company" country. As the Southern ~African Bureau of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development acknowledged in its 
Febraury 1977 repot: 
The role of the multinational corporation in the Rhodesian 
economy is dynamic and pervasive ... A concern of the new 
government will be its relationship to these corporations 
and the role it believes they should play in the future 
Zimbabwe .•. larger firms produce over 80% of Rhodesia's 
manufactures and most of these are probably multinationals, 
integral parts of the world economy. (p. 273). 
Observers report that many multinationals in Rhodesia have 
announced recent cutbacks in operations. It is in the mining 
sector particularly where one finds striking cutbacks by British 
companies like Johannesburg Consolidated and Lomagurdi Smelting 
and Refining , a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation. 
Earlier.·, becaus.e .of .. the. 1.97.7. repe.al. of the Byrd. Amen.dment, .*. 
-
U.S. multinationals such as Union Carbide and Foote Mineral 
Company were forced to curtail their chromite oroduction." 
*The Byrd" Amendment, passed on November 10, 1971, had lirted 
• 
the ban on the import of so-called strategic and critical minerals 
from Rhodesia, including chrome. On March 18, 1977 Carter signed 
P.L. 95-12 Amending the 1945 UN Participation Act and halting the 
importation of the Rhodesian chrome. 
13 
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It has been argued that the pressure of international sanctions 
(passed by the United Nations Security Council on December 16, 
1966 ' and extended in 1968 into a total economic boycott) 
I 
and subsequent investigation into alleged violations by the 
U.S. Treasury Department have caused U.S. oil companies like 
Caltex and Mobil to curtail their activities in Rhodesia. 
But the real dynamics of the oil trade, i.e., indirect supply, 
were accurately portrayed in a June 25, 1978 London Observer 
feature; ''Oil Chiefs Bust Sanctions,'' by Colin Legum. The 
headline story describes how the companies, far from taking 
the wait-and-see stance often reported, were in fact pivotal 
supporters of the Smith regime and had been providing oil 
to Rhodesia via South Africa (through subsidiaries and coopera-
ting South African firms) throughout the period of 1966 to 1978.* 
Slowly but steadily, information is emerging about the 
economic and political activities of the multinationals. Herschel 
Rhoddie, the former South African government official who initiated 
South Africa's Watergate-type scandal,** revealed that he 
worked with leading executives of the Alleghany Ludlum Industries 
(a large U.S. importer of chrome from South Africa and Rhodesia) 
t .o. secre.tly .. c.on.tr.ibut.e. over . . 1 1/2 mi.llion. dollars to. Bi.sh.op. 
*ed. note: Without these oil transfusions the Smith regime could 
n~ver have survived; the economic and military machinery would 
have ground to a halt. Besides Mobil and Caltex, collaborating 
oil companies included Royal/Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, 
51% owned by the British government. For more information- on 
this see the excellent book, Oilgate: the Sanction· Sca·nd·a1 by 
Martin Bailey and his collaborator Bernard Rivers (Hodder and 
Staughton, London 1979). 
**This is discussed in Brown's article. 
• 
Muzorewa and his lieutenant, James Chikerema. In fact, 
Muzorewa has been the bene ficiary of much company largess.* 
. ' .
What the foreign investors want in ,-Rhodesia is reflected in 
15 
this comment from an article in the 'Lb ndoh ob·server of October 21, 
. 
1979:'' ••• to bring this nasty war to an end, and so save possibly 
hundreds of thousands of lives, give the white Rhodesians 
some chance of retaining a stake in the country and prevent 
the economy from being totally wrecked as wer e thos e of Mozambique 
and Angola.'' [Italics mine]. For the moment, the corporations 
have lined up with the Muzorewa government. Much of the.ir 
activity in Rhodesia is channeled through their South African 
subsidiaries or in tandem with the South African government. 
Thus, multinational corporate interests often coincide with those 
of South Africa. Their corporate perspective is like that of 
r . . . 
' 
Kenneth Adelman, a noted African Affairs "expert" who recently 
argued for more American military expenditure in Afric a:** 
Given this background of instability [in the current 
African era], the economic development that both Africans 
and Americans yearn for can only grow from a foundation 
of security.lo 
· *Re cently, it has bee n reported that Muzorewa received approximately 
$100,000 from the Lonrho Corporation.9 During the summer of 1977 
and shortly after his selection as Rhodesia's new Prime Mi nister, 
Muzorewa and his colleagues were c o ntacted by a number of influ-
ential corporate executives. The Mobil Oil Corporation hosted 
a reception for the Bishop in Ne w York and the Cummins Engine 
Company flew him to Indiana to discuss his plans for rebui ] ding 
the Rhodesian economy. 
**I hasten to add, though, that · the multinational corporations are 
not just one vast leviathan. There are clear differences between 
them and some corporate chiefs, like Tiny Rowland and Lonrho Company 
(the London Rhodesian Company) seem to take a more long-term --
more trilateralist -- view on the Zimbabwe Rhodesia problem (cont) 
He insists that it was the white farmers who made 
possible the election that put Prime Minister Muzorewa 
into power this year by organi?ing farm workers and local 
people ·in the countryside, assuring them that there would 
be no repercussions if they voted and transporting them 
to voting places.* 
16 
Muzorewa's election as the first black prime minister of white-
ruled Rhodesia was the second stage of a process which began 
• • 
. \ 
' . 
• 
when the white settler community -- representing 4 per cent 
of the entire population -- voted approval of a constitution 
which guarantees white privilege under a facade of "majority 
rule.**" Muzorewa's election was an exercise carried out by 
the occupying colonial force in F.hodesia; much of the country 
was under martial law. - David Caute described the election in 
his article in The· Na·t ·ion: 
the army and the armed police made it clear that they 
were in business to get people to vote .•• in Matibi the 
majority of the voters were herded in by patrols .•• in 
Joni village in Mangwerde, people were warned that if 
they did not vote their village would be bornbed ..• 11 12 
While Ian Smith and the ,-1hite settler leadership were still 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . ' . . 
*than do some of the less sophisticated and worldy actors like 
E. ~ . Andrews and Alleghany Ludlam of Pittsburgh. The stakes are 
ver y high for Tiny Rowland (perhaps, this accounts for a 
re l atively more long-term perspective). The Guardian (London) 
reported November 11, 1978 that Lonrho and another c ~mpany, 
Liebigs, between them owned over "two million acres of ranching 
land."(continued from previous page) 
*White - Rhodesian Farmer Colin Cook interviewed by Carey Wnfrey. 
New York T·imes, Thursday, Septembe_r 27, 1979. 
**As the American Cammi ttee on Afric·a recently commented: "There 
is not a single chapter in the entire constitution which demon-
strates even the potential for a transition to the majority 
rule in Zirnbabwe. 11 11 
¥ 
.I .I basking in the . glow of their new-found ·pr o t eges , 
17 
ment began to unravel within the African communi ty. The private 
armies of Reverend Sithole, Chief C~irau and Muzorewa -- the 
parties to the internal settlement agreement signed with Smith 
on March 3, 1979 -- have been a source of terror and misery to 
the Zimbabwean peasantry since early 1978. The flames of 
alientation and anger toward the purported '' authentic black 
nat i onalists"* felt by Zimbabweans (especially those in rural 
areas) have been fanned by actions taken by the "new" govern-
ment: extending martial law provisions, detaining more people, 
practicing even more vicious torture than had occrred under 
the previous all-white government. 
Under the emergency regulations of 1976, continued by the 
Muzorewa government, "special court martials" or military courts were 
created. By 1979 there were a minimum of 1,851 political prisoners, 
i.e., those convicted of supporting the liberation struggle . (caught 
carry ing food on the road, for example); thousands of others impri-
soned .as criminal offenders. According to the London Observer 
(March 16, 1980), '' as many as 300 Africans were secretly hung after 
the introduction of martial law in September, 1978. Further, under · 
the state of Ficergency regulations surrmary executions -were often carried out in the 
fie l d by the six different forces on the government side, 
including Auxiliary Forces like Muzorewa's private army.** With 
this record of atrocities in mind: 
*This phrase is taken from the quote at the top of the first page 
of this article. 
**Even Muzorewa's colleague was not immune. In August members 
of Reverend Sithole's private army charged that government 
troops and airplanes massacred over 300 people as they stood un-
armed, waiting for the government. troops to pick up their dis-
carded weapons.14 Recent and new information about the character · 
- · · (continued) 
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More and more Zimbabweans call Muzorewa and other black 
beneficiaries of the internal settlement Zvihlbgawasungata --
the Shona term for "hunting dogs." As Zimbabweans explain 
the significance of the term: It is a stray dog with no 
owner. Anyone who cares can take it hunting for the pot. 
Once it catches an impala or ~ -hare and kills it, the 
hunter takes the meat home and chases the dog away. It 
does not eat any of the meat it kills.13 
The coalition government is coming apart. Starting with 
· the resignation of Co-Minister of Justice Byron Hove, and 
continuing through some dozen separate cases, key members of 
both Muzorewa's UNAC party and of his government began to 
resign in protest. The Bishop's government is not adequate 
to the task of neutralizing the Patriotic Front and rebuilding 
the economy. Recently, a white farmer in the Rhodesian Highlands 
expressed his disappointment in Muzorewa's conciliatory approach 
at the Lancaster Conference: "I think he's made a great mistake. 
He put all his cards 6n that table." 
The essence of the situation, however, is that the mistakes 
are less those of Muzorewa's, than those of his backers. The 
Bishop's nominally independent government cannot address the 
hardships of war, wlii~e ,privilege, and rural exploitation 
whjch all Africans face daily. I t cannot confront the reality 
of deeply institutionalized racism.* Hence, while it might have 
*A good example: the Muzorewa government has explicitly said that 
it will leave the present economic infrastructure intact. The 
state-run Agriculture Finance Corporation in 1975 gave an average 
line of credit to Rhodesia's 6,000 white farmers of $18,000. It 
made available an average credit of $2.00 to the 600,000 African 
farmers. For more on this, see Michael Bratton, ''Settler, State, 
Guerilla War and Rural Underdevelopment in Rhodesia," Issue 
Spring/Summer 1978 pp. 56-6. 
(contintued from previous nage) and actions of Muzorewa's security 
forces is available in the -·detailed study by the British Anti-
Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Expo·sed: The Rhodes·i ·an ·s ·e·c·u·ri t 
For ce ·s · ·and· Their Role in Defena·ing wh·i te Supremacy London, 
October 1979). One most significant conclusion of this study 
is : "the Rhodesian security forces, in short, are incapable of 
playing any positive role in a genuine transfer of power to 
the people of Zimbabwe as a whole , and must be disbanded." 
• 
been an adequate "African solution" the 11uzorewa gove rnment 
as constructed by Smith, the National Front, and their Western 
allies fails as an enduring neo-colqnial solution. Says Byron 
People in our country have been looking for an evidence 
that the agreement is leading toward majority rule. Now 
they have evidence to the contrary. Far from adjusting 
toward majority rule, Smith and hts machinery are trying 
to cheat us, to take us for a ride, and to cheat the 
whole world. [Th~y believe in] t he substance of power 
- -
remaining in white hands, with the shadow of authority 
passing to blacks.15 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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As Ho T,le indicates, the world is watching events in Zimbabwe, 
the United States as closely as Britain. Within a nine month 
period, all of the major actors in the Smith/Muzorewa government 
visited and lobbied in the United States. The major media, 
especially television, began to give regular coverage to Zimbabwe; 
some, notably the wa·sh·ingtbn Pb·st and the Columbia Broadcasting 
System, augmented the number of its personnel stationed in Africa. 
Shortly before resigning from his United Nations post,* 
Andrew Young responded to the question posed by EnCbre, a Black 
American magazine, "Ho,., important do you thi.nk Rhodesia will 
be as a campaign issue?" He said: 
Very important. Because the Republicans have decided 
that Zimbabwe ·is the new racial code word for "Let's 
keep the niggers in th~ir place.'' In . 1968, you 
remember, it was crime in the streets," in 1972 it was 
"busing~r" - in 1980 it is Rhodesia.l 6 
The debate over whether to send an official election obser-
ver team from the U.S., the elections themselves, the visits 
o·f Smith and Mu·zorewa to the· ·u·. s·. ·, · th·e · ·i ·lleg·al· tr·an·sfer· of 
*On August 16, 1979 Andrew Young submitted his resignation to 
President Carter after ha ving held an unauthorized meeting with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization's observer to the UN . 
• 
a number of u.s .... -rnade Huev helicopters and Cessna airolanes 
- - J.. 
to Rh'"t:>~i-:a via Israel* · -- all these events took place in rapid 
succession in 1979. Each of them presented the Carter 
,....,, I 
Administration and its program for Africa with a new set of 
domestic challenges. 
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Beginning with the 1975-76 mobilization protesting U.S • 
intervention in Angola and continuing into the Carter administra-
tion, prominent Black American individuals and organizations 
have been carving out a role in determining the shape and 
direction of U.S. policy and action in Africa. The publication 
of Kissinger's "whites are here to stay" policy memorandum;** 
revelations about the CIA's activities in Africa (extensively 
chronicl~d in books like John Stockwell's· In· Se~rdh. 0£· Enemies: 
A CIA Story, 1978 ); and the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa 
galvanized Black and mixed organizations towar.d r .enewed levels 
of activity. In 1977 the NAACP sponsored a major factfinding 
trip to Africa and issued a -report -calling for sanctions against 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
*Jim Hoagland, "lL Bell Copters Said Smuggled Into Rhodesia," 
wa·snington Post, December 15, 1978. Also see, p·i ·re Force Exposed: 
The Rho·de·sian· Securi·ty Fo·rces and Their R0·1e in· oe·fend·1·ng· Wh1·te 
Secur.i ·ty, op. cit. 
**ed. note: The 1969 classified National Security Council Study 
Memorandum, NSSM 39, presented a range of policy options for 
Southern Africa. Kissinger pursued option 2 (dubbed the "Tarbaby" 
Option -- after the Uncle Remus story) which recommended a "tilt" 
to the white regimes. Its key premises were that South Africa 
is and should remain the dominant regional power; that Blacks 
cannot gain political rights through violent action; and that 
"the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive 
change can come about is through them." The approach was two-
fold: counter-insurgency to defeat theliberation movements and 
affectionately nudging the whites to make minor reforms in order 
to enhance stability. NSSM 39 is reprinted and analyzed in 
Mohamed A. El _ Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., · The Kis·sihger· ·study of 
Southern Africa (Conn: Lawrence Hill, 1975). 
So.uth Africa as well as Rhodesia. Andrew Young's demonstrated 
concern with Africa in his highly visible position of UN 
Ambassador helped many Black instittitions deepend their aware-
ness and sharpen their position. But above all, it was the 
founding of TransAfrica which signalled the dawning of a new 
. period of Black concern with Africa.* Founded in 1977, an 
outgrowth of the 1976 Black Congressional Caucus' A·frio.an 
American ~1anifesto on Southern A·fr·ica (an official declaration 
endorsing the concept of armed struggle by the Southern African 
liberation m0.vements) , TransAf'rica rapidly became ~~ a nationally-
based membership organization functioning as a Black American 
lobby on international affairs. 
Thus, the Carter Administration, while attempting to 
implement its trilateralist solutions to what it calls "the 
arc of crisis stretching across Southern Asia to Southern 
Africa," has to contend with the domestic ramifications of 
policy decisions. When the State Department permitted Smith, 
Sithole and Muzorewa to visit the U.S. in October 1978 and July 
1979, mass counter demonstrations were held in every city in 
which they appeared. When President Carter considered lifting 
the sanctions against Rhodesia in the spri ng of 1979, as 
21 
directed. by. the .1.9.7 8 .Case-Javi.ts. Am.en.dmen.t, . he. w.as. confr.onted 
*T~ere is no intent on this author's part to assert this is a new 
development. On the contrary, the long history of Black .American 
concern and involvement with Africa and the Caribbean -- seen 
in the work of leaders like Marcus Garvey, W.E. Dubois, Paul 
Robeson, Malcolm X, and Alphaeus Hinton --- is a subject which 
is in need of more exhaustive attention . ... The --difference is 
that with the Carter administration the ·pote·n·t ·i ·a1 for influence 
is greater, largely because Carter owes an elector al debt to 
Blacks for having received over 85% of the Black vote in 1976. 
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with a "m·aintain sanctions'' campaign organized by TransAfrica, 
. . . 
, 
'· l_ 
the Washington Office on Africa and some thirty-odd other groups 
organized into a coalition called the Southern Africa Working 
; ' 
Group. Black American publications like the· Amst·erdam· News and 
the Detroit Chronicle, and media organizations such as the 
National Negro Publishers Assocation systematically pressured 
Carter to abide by the March 8 UN Security Council decision 
which declared the election fraudulent and urqed member states 
-· 
to refrain from sending observers. 
The potential significance of the Blae k American community 
in influencing Western policy toward Africa was underscored by a 
November 9-11 Conference on Southern Africa sponsored by the 
British-American Ditchley Foundation. This quiet counterpart 
to the Lancaster Conference was convened for 25-30 "distinguished 
individuals" from W.es.tern E.ur.ope , . Jap.an. an.d. th.e. U .• S .• . *. in order 
*(continued from previous page) Not only is thls a strengthened 
Black American constituency. It is a Vietnam-sensitive Black 
American constituency; people who, like most U.S. citizens, are 
disinclined to be involved in another Vietnam-like intervention. 
On this see Michael Klare, "The New Interventionism: Curing 
the Vietnam Syndrome," The N·ati·on, October 13, 1979, and a novel 
by Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, called· Th·e Entancipa-
tion of Wakefield Clay (Bogle l'Ouverture Press, London, 1978). 
Also see "Resurgent Militarism" by Klare et. al. in this volume. 
*Among the participants were: Keith Douglas Scott, Australian 
A!Pbassador to South Africa; Christooher L.ai ·d·l aw., Cha:itman of British 
Petroleum; Anthony Tuke, Chairman of Barclays Bank, President of 
the British Bankers Association, and a Trilatenal Commissioner; Neil 
Forster, Director of Br·istbw Helicopters; Anton Rupert, Chairman 
of the Rembrandt Group of Companies~ South Africa, - and Director 
- -
of the South Africa Reserve Bank; Francis Vale, Public Affairs 
Director of Rio Tinto Zinc; and the Managing Director of Royal 
Dutch Shell. Attending also were Richard Moose, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary for State for African Affairs; Shiro Saito, the Asia 
Area Chief of the Japan Economi·c Journal; Jerome Caminada, Foreign 
News Editor of the-London Times; David Harrison, Producer for 
BBC Television; Chester Crocker, Director of African Studies at 
the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International 
Studies; and William Foltz, Director of the Council on Foreign 
Relations' Africa Project. 
• 
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"to focus on the questi.on of coordination of Western Democracies' 
policies, and ways in which they might help bring about effective 
long-term solutions to the se~ious problems of the area [Southern 
' 
Africa]". Several Black Americans, among them TransAfrica's 
Director Randall Robinson, were invited. When they declined 
the invitation because no Black South Africans had been asked 
to participate*, the Ditchley Foundation began frantically 
"combing the woods" (Ditchley's words) to locate Black Americans 
who might cooperate. This incident illustrates the critical 
importance Western policymakers and corporate strategists 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . 
attach to winning Black American legit·imi·zati·on of their 
activities on the African continent. In addition, the atten-
dance by leading corporate executives, diplomats, media chiefs, 
and academics signifies the urgency with which they are trying 
to develop new strategies toward Southern Africa hand in hand 
with a rationale for public consumption. 
Lobbying by Black groups and traditional progressive allies 
like the American Committee on Africa (called ''liberationists" 
by the CIA-linked George town University Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), is not easy. Besides the 
perennial problem of inadequate financing, TransAfrica and 
other groups have to compete against a sophisticated, inter-
connected, and well-financed- lobbying effort being -waged by 
*Later one Black South Afr'ican ''industrialist", ' i.e. factory 
worker, and one ''Cape Town Colored" were asked to come. 
• 
various forces hoping to see the existing Muzorewa government 
recognized and sanctions lifte·d immediately. Among the U.S. 
forces actively promoting the Smi th/Muzorewa o.ption are: from 
. , 
I 
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the corporate world, Union Carbide and Allegheny-Ludlum Industries; 
from the Congress, Senators Dole (Kansas), Helms (North Carolina), 
Ha:-,rakawa (California) and Representatives Ashbrook (Ohio), 
Schweiker (Pennsylvania) and De Concini (Arizona); from the 
church community, the Texas Methodists and the Christian 
League of Southern Africa; and from the political 'right', 
many of which maintain full-time professional lobbyists,* 
the Liberty Lobby, the Ameri~an . Rhqdesian Association, the . 
the American Security Council, the Coaliti on f or P,eace Throuqt 
Friends of Rhodesia . and the Association of Americans to Save stre:i~~ 
J~ ~~-
Africa. Many of these U.S.-based pro-internal settlement forces 
have international links. For instance, as mentioned above, 
Allegheny Ludlum's president, E.F. Andrews, collaborated with 
the South African government in making secret payments to 
Muzorewa. ** ~he F ' d f h d ' ' 
.. rien so Ro esia, Inc., is closely linked 
' ~ . ~ . 
*Some indication of the resources available to the !·professional 
lobbvists (Neville Romaine is the most famous Rhodesia lobbyist) 
is seen in a recent revelation about lobbying in Wash~ngton 
to get more U.S. arms for King Hassan and Morocco. Afri·c·a· News, 
October 19, 1979, reports that chiefly thnough the D·.c. · public 
relations firm, DGA International, Morocco spent over a million 
do l lars in the 1978-79 year attempting to buy the support of 
the U.S. government and the public. 
**Andrews' perspective is quite clear. He said in 1976: "The 
question is what .can the private sector do with an e ye to keeping 
Rhodesia .. in the Western sphere as opposed to the Soviet and 
Cuban sphere?" Afri·c·a· .. Ne'ws ., .. October . 25, 1976. For the full 
story see· The Chri·s ·t ·ian s ·c·i ·en·ce Monitor, August 9, 1979, 
and South~rn· African Magaziiie, July/August 1979, p. 21. 
• • 
to the official Rhodesian Information Office which maintains 
an office in Washington in spite of th~ s~nctions- CSIS 
(mentioned above), a major promoter of Smith and a moderate 
. 
; 
Black solution, was found to be directlv linked to Britain's 
.... 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, which in turn has direct 
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links to British police and army training institutions. 17 (See 
· the notes following Peter Thompson's article for further dis-
cussion of these ties). 
It is within this matrix of domestic and international 
forces that the Carter Administration must try to apply its 
trilateralist principles to the Zimbabwean national liberation 
struggle. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security 
Advisor and first Director of the Trilateral Commission, said 
to the 1979 Annual Convention of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors: 
In the mushrooming cities of the Third World, congested 
and rootless populations are more susceptible th~n ever 
to political mobilization. Nationalism is increasingly 
imbued with ideological content, intensifying the desire 
to assert both national and social goals. · 
Cumulatively, traditional global relationships are under-
going profound changes in a context of extraordinary 
diversity. The role of the United States in that context 
is paramount, but no longer p·redominant. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
It follows that our central goal must be to· import posit·ive 
direction to· change by creating for it a stable and in-
creasingly cooperative framework. 18 [emphasis mine]. 
How does the U.S. manage to cooperatively play a "paramount, 
but no· 1o·n·ger pr·edotninan·t 11 role?* · Several ·app·roa·che·s are -vi·s ·ible 
*What did Brzezinski have in mind? Webster's· New World oi·ctionary 
(College Edition) defines paramount as "ranking higher than any 
other, as in oower or importance; chief, supreme [italics mine]. 
Predominant means having "ascendency, authority, or dominating 
influence over others. [ed. note: It would seem Brzezinski had 
confused these terms until another nuance is shown this time 
in The Arn·erican Heritage Dictionary of· th·e English La·ngua·ge. 
The second definition of predominant is: "most common or conspicuous; 
prevalent." (Emphasised).] 
• 
in the Carter response to Congressional pressure to lift 
sanctions during the Spring of 1979 and in the U.S.-British 
relationship in organizing the Lancaster House ·constitutional 
, 
Conference. First, in exemplary trilateralist fashion, the 
Carter Adrninistratj_on permits Britain to play the "Matt Dillon" 
marshall role at Lancaster House, with the U.S. appearing as 
the faithful deputy "Chester''.* Second, Carter makes certain 
that to whatever extent possible the U.S. is given very low 
profile, role playing the silent deputy as well as the faithful 
one. Third, the Carter and Thatcher Administrations pursue 
steps which assure them maximum flexibility, for in the post-
Vietnam era it is flexibility and not raw muscle power which 
characterizes the winner. The appointment of Lord Carrington, 
the British Foreign Secretary, as Lancaster House Conference 
Chairman, insured that trilateralism and corporate interests 
would be well served.** The Lord served as Britain's Secretary 
of State for Energy in 1974 and was the Minister of Aviation 
Supply from 1971-74. He is now or has been a director of the 
following multinationals:· Rio· Tinto· Zinc· corpor~tion, Australia 
and New Zealand Bank, Hambros Bank, Barclay's Bank, Amalgamated 
Metal Company and the Cadbury Schweppes Company. And if this 
background i~ not enough to ensure that he is a good, skillful 
and "ne.u.tral.". ch.a .irper.s .on, . h.e. h.as_ .the. ad.di.ti.ona.1 · ·g.uali£ i .c.a tions 
. - -
*The reference is to the famed American TV ~Jestern Gunsrroke. Dillon is 
a giant blockbuster. Chester is diminuitive but faithful to 
his leader. 
**ed. note: Carrington is seen as the guiding light of reason 
in Thatcher's Conservative Government in so · as international 
politics are concerned. His appointment as Foreign Secretary 
26 
was a sign there would be little, if any, break with the policies 
of David Owen, his predecessor in Callaghan's Labor Government 
with which the Carter Admininstration Had had goon .rapport. 
• 
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of being a past member of the Trilateral Commission (See 
"Who's Y\Tho on the Trilateral Commission."*and the· current president 
of the British-Iran Society. 19 
Charlie Cobb, a journalist covering the Lancaster House 
Conference, described the third approach -- flexibilitv --
. quite aptly when he explained British move~ at the conference: 
In deciding its next move meanwhile, the British govern-
ment is wrestling with conflicting pressures from African 
states on the one hand and right wingers in the Conserva-
tive Party on the other. Last week's party conference 
[showed] there is still strong sentiment tha·t the Muzorewa 
government should be recognized. Thatcher's government 
does not dissent from this go~o but seeks maximum flexi-
bility on timing and tactics. 
U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, employed the same 
approach when he explained Carter's June 7, 1979 decision not 
to lift sanctions. Besides emphas±zing cooperation with 
Britain, his remarks were filled with phrases like "not 
rushing forward", letting "the situation evolve," maintaining 
"the ability to communicate with all the parties to the conflict." 
He commented that whatever one's interest in ideology, all 
concerned shared one common positive feature: a desire for 
''peaceful change in Southern Africa.'' In short, the Carte~/ 
trilateral approach is to make the best of a tension-wrought 
high-stake situation, like Zimbabwe, through accomodation rather 
than confrontation. (Like Muhammad P_li .the trilateral preference 
is to ride the ropes rather than get in the center of the 
rin· and ~un~h··1t·· but. ·) ·· 
... 9 . .. . , _ .... . . 
*See Evercle11', Sklar,. "~vho' s y,]ho on the Trila.t'era.1' .c"ommi'ssion" 
in Tr·i1·at~·ra'J.1 i ·sm·: Elite Planning fbr World .Management, 1980). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
, ' 
t"1hatever the outcome of the Lancaster Conference* --
which will see either new elections including the Patriotic 
Front or a deal struck between Britain and the Muzorewa 
government, however, inadequate -- there are certain conclu-
sions we can reach about the West's strategy for Zimbabwe 
and about the broader question of trilateralism and African 
liberation movements. 
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Trilateralists attempt to defuse conflict. Their strategy 
is that of initiating dialogue with their enemy -- certain 
that ultimately the sheer economic hegemony of the international 
capitalist system will neutralize, by coercion and cooptation, 
the ideological fervor of the nationalists. The U.S. and 
Britain are maintaining positions in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
' 
conflict which maximize their flexibility. They are distinguishing 
between short-term and long-term objectives. Neither wants 
to see a Zimbabwe run by the Patriotic ~ront. But both govern-
ments -- unlike the right wing within the Tory Party (the Con-
servative Party headed by Margaret Thatcher), or that in the 
Uni.t .ed. S.tate.s . 1 .ik.e .. the. Amer i .c .an. Enter.nris:e . .In.s.t .i .t .ut.e .fo.r · ·Public 
-
*The Lancaster House Conference which began in London September 8, 
1979 was a ninth attempt at a negotiated solution to the Rhodesian 
problem. Although officially hosted by the British government, 
the conference was the product of a compromise with African nations, 
especially the Front-Line states, at the August Commonwealth 
Conference meeting in Lusaka. All parties were present at the Lan-
caster Conference includina rnilitarv representatives from both the 
J .... -
Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian government. Besides the European 
members of the Commonwealth the Lancaster conference also clearly 
had the full backing of the Carter Administration. 
• 
29 
Poli.cy Research (AEI) * -- would at the present moment stop 
short of heavy and direct military intervention to prevent the 
Patriotic Front from coming to power. Unlike many in their 
own constituencies, the Carter and Thatcher administrations 
argue that in the long run the Patriotic Front, especially 
the Joshua Nkomo element of the Front, can be managed • 
U.S.-British strategy vis-a-vis Zimbabwe pursues another 
approach which is reflective of the essence of trilateralisrn, 
i.e., the use of regionally influential countries like 
Tanzania and Nigeria as power brokers in managing change. That 
aporoach counts on manipulating the very real pressures felt 
by the front line states. New African (September 1979) quoted 
' . 
Julius Nyrere, the President of Tanzania, as having said that 
' 
. '· 
the reas on he decided to back the British Lancaster House ini-
tiative was that it was the last chance for a peaceful settlement 
*AEI, with a Board of Directors which includes people like Melvin 
Laird, William Colby, Barry Goldwater, Clark Clifford and 
John Johnson of Eb·ony magazine, openly argues for a higher U.S. 
military profile in Southern Africa because of Africa's vital 
role in maintaining U.S. global interests. Although AEI stops 
short of advocating commitment of U.S. combat forces, it 
nonetheless urges increased planning preparation and expenditure 
so as to have such an option easily available at various locations 
in sub-Saharan Africa. See Palmer, ''U.S. Security Interests 
and Africa South of the Sahara," · AEI Defen·se· Review II: 6, 1978, 
pp. 2-43. 
Also see the forthcomin9. report by Bob Lawrence and Holly Sklar, 
tentatively titled, U.S. Africa Policy ·for the· 1·90o's: wh·at· the 
Think T·ank·s · ar·e· Think·ing -- covering AEI, Georgetown Center for 
Strategic and International Studies as well as the more liberal 
"Rockefeller Commission on Southern Africa and Council on Foreign 
Relations - winter 1980, Africa Project, Institute for Policy Studies • 
• 
and that if it failed he could ''foresee Rhodesia becoming 
another Mozambi'que ! " He went on to give 'his assurance ·that 
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the Patriotic Front would not be an obstacle to the new initiative. 
I 
Patriotic Front leaders want to make their own decisions inde-
pendent of the West and even the Front Line States, or their 
socialist allies; but they are dependent on the latter for 
· sanctuary and political and material support. 
What is behind Nyerere's comment? On the one hand, Nyerere 
wants to see ·the war end.* Just as earnestly he is committed 
to seeing genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, 
Nyerere is faced with a Tanzanian balance of payments deficit 
expected to reach $350 million by the end of Fiscal Year 
1979/80. Tanzania is awaiting a decision about needed supple-
mentary financial assitance from both the International Monetary 
Fund {IMF) and from the World Bank, to which it is heavily 
indebted, giving the World Bank a larger and larger role in 
development planning and financing. Debt pressures increase 
the leverage ·whi.ch the trilateralist West currently holds over 
''new influentials'' like Tanzania. (See article by James Phillips 
on the IMF) • 
*The war has been long and costly to Tanzania which has provided 
the PF with support and training facilities. It has been even 
more costly to Tanzaniats neighbor to the South, Mozambique. 
At the time of this writing for instance, Rho·desian mercenaries 
led Portuguese settlers, ex-Frelimo {the governing Party) suppor-
ters and - South ·Africans, and captured the central town of Macossa. 
{Th~: Guardi~n, London, October 23, 1979). 
• 
Zambia and Botswana face similar predicaments, only 
their situations are ~orsened by their historical economic 
dependerice upon South Africa. So too is the case with Ang~~~~ 
31 
and Mozambique whi.ch inherited not just poverty, underdevelopment 
and war-time destruction, but also economies which were deli-
berately tilted so as to serve the Witwatersrand (South Africa) 
. . . . . . . . 
industrial mining complex. 
. 
Add the costs of daily military agression, vicious bombings 
and helicopter forays from South Africa and/or Rhodesia* ··· 
which cost the lives of some four Mozambicans or Angolans 
and many Zimbabweans daily; the 150,000 Zimbabwean refugees 
which the Mozambican economy is sustaining; add the 500 million 
dollars in railroad and other revenues Mozambique has lost 
since it closed its border in compliance with the UN sanctions 
against Rhodesia in March, 1976; and a stark picture emerges 
of the pressures upon the Front Line States.** 
. . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . , • . . . ' . 
~*South Africa and Rhodesia both have raided refugee camps and 
PF quarters in Zambia and Botswana reaching even into the Zambian 
capital Lusaka, to attack, for example, Nkomo's residence. But 
consistently the brunt of the most vicious agression has been 
reserved for sites in Angola and most especially, Mozambique. 
During the London Conference Salisbury cut off shipments of 
corn· from South Africa via the Southern Rhodesia railway to 
Zambia, for added leverage over Zambian President Kaunda. See 
Michael Holman, "Why Salisbury is Squeezing Kaunda," Financial 
Times, October 24, 1979. 
**ed. note: Military attacks against the Front Line States 
went on throughout the London Conference: "Troops of the Zimbabwe 
Rhodesian Government have killed about· 60 Rhodesian guerillas 
and three Zambian civilians in raids into Zambia •.. The attack, 
the third since talks began in London eight weeks ago, was 
started yesterday by air and ground forces . and .ended today'', 
Rhodesian rnili tary hea·dquarters said. · (New York· Times, November 4, 
1979). 
• 
The trilateralist states play upon these pressures in 
their quest to harness the radica1 nationalist fervor of the 
Patriotic Front's ar1ned struggle. ,. 
The Trilateralist approach in Africa today faces a grave dilemma. . 
., 
Domestic constituencie~ prohibit the use of traditional solu-
tions, such as military interventions -- which, as in the 
case of Vietnam, do not always prevail. At the same time 
the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa 
have developed a momentum which poses a radical threat to the 
world capitalist system. Thus, trilateralism turns to new 
partners and new solutions: ''new influentials" l ike Tanzania 
are used as peace agents, the defenders of "stability" and 
"world order". Colin Legum, a veteran participant/observer 
32 
of events in Africa, recently summarized the trilateral approach 
in Africa quite succinctly when he wrote: 
This new Western approach to the problems of the region 
contained five major elements. First, every stage of 
planning and implementing the two initiatives involved 
close consultation with the African states, most directly 
concerned-.- the five Front-line States (Tanzania, Zambia, 
Mozambique, Botswana and Angola), as well as Nigeria. 
Second, in the case of Rhodesia and Nambia, the leading 
liberation mo.vements (the Patriotic Front and Swapo, 
respectively) were brought directly into the negotiating 
process. Third, the stated objective was to achieve 
majority rule. Fourth, the agreed aim was to defuse the 
violence; while ·not condemning the armed struggle, the 
premise of the diplomatic approach was that armed violence, 
was not necessarily the only road to majority. rule. Fifth, 
explicit opposition to the introduction of big power politics 
into the region. (The justification for the Anglo-American 
role was that both ·countries were already involved in the 
area and could use their leverage positively. Meanwhile, 
no new foreign powers should be brought in as this would 
complicate the negotiating process and impede the achieve-
ment of majority rule.)21 
• 
Trilateralism will persist, devising other strategies, 
calling on other countries. As Samora Machel,quoted earlier 
in this paper, states: "When the internal solution doesn't 
work, they turn to the external one." 
But the liberation mo.vements also have their strategies 
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and counter-strategies. By the±r very nature, the participants 
in liberation movements besides being excellent teachers are 
also excellent students. Recently Patriotic Front Co-President, 
Robert Mugabe, answered a auestion about the common work 
of ZANU and ZAPU. As with the PF's consistent demonstration 
of flexibility at the Lancaster Conference, the response 
by Mugabe showed that the 1-vest' s trilateralism is among the 
subjects he has mastered. He said, showing patience and 
confidence: 
We try to work on a political level against the 
strategy worked out by Britain and the United States. 
Since the Kissinger Plan, Geneva Conference and the 
Anglo-American proposals, we resisted the bid to create 
a nee-colonial state in the country. We have also had 
the same diplomatic drive on the Zimbabwean question. 
That is at the political level. The joint [military] · 
operations that we envisage are intended to2~alance the coooeration we have at:~the ooli tical level. 
. -
rhe s a me patient and strategic deliberation was demon -
~trated by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) 
Commander, Josiah Tongogara, when he was asked what the London 
Lancaster House Conference meant to him: 
To us, London is definitely our second front. What 
I mean by second front is that we have the home front 
which is the front for physical confrontation, and th~n 
we have the London front, which we term a peaceful 
front. In the home front, whenever we go to the battle, 
you put on your uniform, get your kit bag and your gun 
and everything. Now here in London you put on your suit 
and a tie and then you go and talk. So it's a peaceful 
front. And we think that we don't mind that we have it 
h~re in London . We could have had it anywhere , even i n 
Zimbabwe, or Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia. But the fact 
is that this conference is a product of what is happening 
on the home front.23 
• 
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The wry "commandante" also shared with his post-Vietnam/ 
post-Iran/post-Nicaragua audience a portion of the ZANLA "histori-
cal imagination", the ZANLA sense of history, when he pointed out 
that ZANLA came into the London talks concious that it was 
their forces, they as part of the Zimbabwean people who had 
created the historical circumstances which had birthed the 
Lancaster House Conference. With a calm which could only come 
from having been a participant and a leader in the bush throughout 
not only the Zimbabwean but throughout most of the Mozambican 
guerilla struggle as well, he responded to a query that ZANLA 
was not coming to London as the winn~r .· of the war: 
When the Rhodesians declared UDI in 1965, Wilson said 
he was not going to send troops, but if the situation 
inside Zimbabwe deteriorates and there is a need to 
intervene, the British are going to intervene. What 
is happending here at Lancaster House is that the 
British now want to intervene. They think they want 
to send their administration, they want to take over, 
because there is something going on. It is the war 
that makes them think so. We could have refused to come 
to talk to the British. We have lost nothing. We are 
making progress every minute inside Zimbabwe. And I 
can assure you, if we had remained in the bush and 
said continue, we forget about London, we would still 
be going to win. 24 
*On December 26, 1979, Tongogara died in an automobile accident 
near Chimoio, Mozambique. He died one day before the Rhodesian 
ceasefire was to go into effect. Some indication of the esteem 
held for him by the ttozambican : leadership is provided in the 
following extract fron President Samora Machel's tribute to 
him presented at a Maputo funeral ceremony: 
When Commander Tongogara died we did not want to believe 
it •... We are all born, we grow and we die. But not all 
deaths · are the same. Some deaths have litttle impact. 
Others weigh so heavily upon us that it is hard to bear 
the weight ..•. Our people did not want to accept it. O~r 
youth refused be believe that Commander Tongogara was 
dead. All wanted to see him march again, in combat, 
commanding with the dynamism which was so natural to him. 
His military colleagues of the Mozambique People's 
Liberation Forces (FPLM) even today do not believe 
that Tongogara is dead . They cannot accept it . They 
accept and believe only, that he is silent, that he no 
longer speaks, but that his life goes on .... (continued) 
\ 
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Tongogara had gone beyond being a Zimbabwean. He was a 
fighter of the Mozambican People,'s Liberation Forces --
he was Mozambican. Tongogara was a fighter of the 
Tanzanian forces -- he was a Tanzanian. He was a fighter 
of the Zambian forces -- he was a Zambian .••. 
I spoke to him on December 24, two days before he died, in 
the company of Vice-President Muzenda. We spoke at 
length on the problems of Zimbabwe, with all frankness. 
And we were proud to observe his correct perspectives 
concerning the Patriotic Front. He spoke not in the name 
of ZANU, but in the name of ZANU-ZAPU, he spoke in the 
name of the Patriotic Front. We applauded this. 
Because of his work, Tongogara is a national hero of the 
People's Republic of Mozambique. We all die. But 
Tongogara had a merit, a merit which we don't all have. 
He died without betraying, he died without selling himself, 
he died without being corrupted. Fighting always for 
the good of his people. 
This is what we ask of the members of ZANU. This is 
what we ask of the members of ZAPU. This is what we 
ask of the people of Zimbabwe. This is what we ask of 
the Patriotic Front. This is the moment for unity. 
Farewell, friend Tongogara. We marched together, we 
fought together and we won together. We will continue 
to struggle. We will liberate Southern Africa. We will 
create happiness in Southern Africa. This was the cause 
to which you dedicated your whole life. We will continue. 
Farewell, friend Tongogara. 
• 
• 
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Postscript - 1 
The months between September 1979 and March 1980 witnessed 
a renewed and concentrated effort on the part of the Trilateralist 
, 
West to manage the Zimbabwean liberation movement. The Patriotic 
Front emerged from this contest with successes in two major 
new arenas: 1) the diplomatic arena; and 2) the electoral 
arena, where not only did the Patriotic Front persevere through 
a rigged electoral process but it went on to decisively win 
the election themselves. 
As indicated earlier the Lancaster House Conference began 
on September 8, 1979. Throughout the various stages of the 
negotiations - the constitutional discussion, the cease-fire, 
the elections and the transition phase - the manner in which 
the British, Lord Carrington in particular, conducted the 
discussions led many to suspect that the British strategy was 
to provoke the Patriotic Front into a walk-out so that a 
separate legitimizing solution could be then worked out with 
the surviving African participant, the "Blacksmith", Muzorewa. 
It is critical, however, from the outset that the 
Lancaster House Conference be placed within a broader context 
before critically analyzing its component elements. 
The diplomatic struggle for fifteen weeks from September 
to December 1979 should be viewed within the context of 1) the 
exhaustion of the Rhodesian settler forces and of the Front 
Line States;. 2) the growing contradiction between Britain/USA 
on the one hand, and the white supremacist communities of 
• • 
• 
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Rhodesia and South Africa on the other, vis-a-vis the future 
of white minority rule; and 3) what form a continued Western 
I 
economic presence would have (given the importance of Southern 
Africa to the capitalist world system) after new political 
arrangements would be created to satisfy, but contain, African 
nationalist aspirations. 
The short term objective of the Front Line States as the 
Lancaster House Conference began was clearly to end the 
guerilla war. For all the countries concerned the costs of 
maintaining the war were simply too high. For Zambia in 
particular, continuation of the Zimbabean guerrilla struggle 
would have meant the end of the Kaunda administration -
whether by Rhodesian military conquest or as a result of 
internal Zambian contradictions and tensions. 
In addition the April 1979 Rhodesian commando raid into 
central Lusaka and the takeover of Lusaka airport had 
succeeded in seriously damaging ZAPU's operational 
headquarters and storerooms. Even during the Lancaster House 
talks there were thirty combined Rhodesian raids in fifty 
days from September to November 1979. 26 
But the long term objective of the Front Line States 
was a quite different matter. Muzorewa was totally unacceptable 
to either the Front Line States or Africa generally. (In 
July 1979 the OAU passed a formal resolution not recognizing 
• 
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the Muzorewa government and stating that the Patriotic 
. 
Front was the sole legitimate representative of the people of 
Zimbabwe.)* Thus, it was that the, Front Line States saw a 
successfully completed Lancaster House Conference as a pro-
gressive development towards the objective of dethroning the 
"little bishop". As President s ·amora Machel put it on December 23 
just after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreements in 
a speech to the Diplomatic Co~ps in Mozambique: 
We are meeting here to say: the tobacco farmer's 
regime is finished. Smith does not give orders now, 
Smith cannot commit aggressions against the People's 
Republic of Mozambique. Smith has been defeated. 
Smith has been written down in the history of shame. 
We are here to say: the Smith/Muzorewa regime has 
ceased to exist. Muzorewa no longer governs. 
Muzorewa went to London to sign the death certificate 
of his work and his government. Muzorewa went to 
recognize the illegality of his own government. He 
went to recognize that his elections were a farce, 
he went to recognize himself as a puppet. 
Throughout the Lancaster House talks there were other outside 
forces that were important. Besides the Front Line States 
and Nigeria, the Commonwealth Secretariat played a key, if 
not crucial, role from the time of the Lusaka Commonwealth 
meeting in August in Lusaka through to the final decision by 
the Patriotic Front leaders to initial the final document. 
Indeed so central were the interventions by the Guyanese 
Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Shridath Sonny Ramphal, 
that experienced observers of the whole Rhodesian scene called 
*This move by the OAU was wholly unanticipated and unacceptable 
to the West. The United States especially lobbied the OAU 
to keep the resolution from being passed. Such a move by the 
OAU "new influential" was a step outside of the shelter of 
what Basil Davidson calls "the Anglo-American umbrella." 
• 
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called Ramphal "the man who saved the Rhodesia deal."2 8 Time 
and time again it was Ramphal who interpreted the African 
interests or advised the Thatcher administration as to how 
to respond to various deadlocks or crises in the negotiating 
pr ocess . 
On December 22 , 1~79 the ubiquitous Daily Telegraph 
added its bouquets to an international press coverage which was 
strongly hinting that Lord Carrington should receive the Nobel 
Peace Prize for having staged a successful Lancaster House 
Conference . That day the Daily Telegraph headlined that 
"Lord Carrington had pulled off Britain ";s greatest diplomatic 
coup of the decade ." 29 The banner article went on in the 
last sentence to concede that President 1,1yerere of Tanzania had 
performed in a "constructive and vital role in bringing about 
the Lancaster House talks and keeping them going ," but basically 
the article was in harmony with an international press position ~; 
that the ''terrs '' had been brought to heel , peace was achieved 
and London had emerged triumphant from the talks. 
Nothing could have been a more inaccurate statement of 
the case. Within a two month period the British press in 
particular would turn up mater ial which would indicate the 
desperate legnths to which Br itain was willing to go in order 
to manage the outcome of the talks. The relevation also would 
show the extent of collaboration between the British government 
and the Rhodesian intelligence. 
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What was revealed first in the New Statesman 30 and 
then in the Sunday Times (London) was that the standard govern-
ment surveillance and phone tapping mechanisms were mobilized 
to the widest possible extent to insure that Carrington would 
pull off the coup of the decade. What was revealed by the 
· papers was that (under direct orders from the Prime Minister 
and Lord Carrington) every hotel room, every car, every home, 
every toilet, every key person, every visitor, in all the 
delegations would be bugged and monitored. Further, it was 
shown that in order to interpret the African languages and 
dialects and incidentally keep the Rhodesian intelligence 
informed (also giving them the upper hand), the British engaged 
Rhodesian security as part of the personnel staffing the 
operation. The Sunday Times called the whole operation "the 
biggest surveillance sweep in recent years and pointed out in 
blunt language that: 
The British government wanted to know as much as 
possible about the tactics and goals of each dele-
gation - and sanctioned a massive operation to find 
out. Phones were tapped. Hotel rooms were bugged. 
Diplomatic communications were monitored. 'That was 
why Lord Carrington could conduct the conference on 
the basis of brinkmanship. The intelligence services 
told him where the brinks were." 31 
On December 21, 1979, the leaders of the Patriotic 
Front (PF), Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa representing the Salisbury adminis-
tration, and Lord Carrington representing the British govern-
ment, signed the Lancaster House Rhodesia Agreements. A cease-
fire date of December 28 was determined and dates of 
• 
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February 14 (for whites) and February 27, 28, 29 (for blacks) 
were selected for elections. 
Preceeding the signing itseLf were a series of events, 
a listing of which serves to underscore the extent to which 
the West acted in concert, with both flexibility and resolve 
but also with deliberate speed to deliver a Lancaster House 
agreement in the shortest time possible: 
December 12 - The newly appointed British governor for 
Rhodesia, Lord Soarnes, arrives Salisbury; 
Zimbabwe Rhodesia becomes once again the 
British colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
- Britain ends sanctions against Rhodesia. 
December 15 - Britain formally ends talks without the 
signatures of the Patriotic Front leaders. 
December 16 - President Carter in an executive action ends 
US sanctions against Rhodesia. France and 
Japan follow in several days. (Britain and the 
US formally condemned by a UN Security 
Council vote for taking unilateral steps 
to end what was a Security Council imposed 
embargo.) 
December 16.:...19 - After meetings with Front Line States 
and major concessions by Lord Carrington 
(suggested by the Commonwealth secretariat) 
the PF agrees to sign the agreement. 
The West, specifically the Carter and Thatcher administra-
tions, necessarily had to emerge from the Lancaster House Con-
ference with a new arrangement. But it was not a matter of 
dire necessity simply in order to prevent the liberation 
struggle from corning to complete fruition with the possibility 
of another Angola type final development. No, the Lancaster 
House Agreement involved much more than stemming the Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle. And it even involved more than dressing 
up Muzorewa in a more militant garb and black facing his admin-
istration - this would have materialized if the PF had walked out and 
• 
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the second class solution had been adopted. What was at 
stake in Zimbabwe is what remains at stake in Southern Africa, 
namely the containment of the fi~es so as to prevent so 
far-reaching a radicalization of the situation as to consume 
the ultimate prize, the West's consummate partner nation, 
apartheid South Africa. What is of paramount importance is 
that the . fundamental linkage between the capitalist machinery 
and industry of the Euro-American world (and an accompanying 
'kith and kin' racial bond) and apartheid South Africa be not 
severed or altered in any fundamental way, Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher expressed it all cogently and neatly speaking 
in New York City, mid-December 1979. Calling her remarks "The West 
in the World Today" she opened talking about how in this period, 
where at any time the world economy could be shaken by political 
upheaval,all shared "a direct practical interest in the orderly 
settlement of political disputes." She continued: 
The Lancaster House Agreement could prove a major step 
towards peaceful evolution and away from violent 
revolution in Southern Africa. We are encouraged to 
persevere with the Five Power initiative to achieve an 
all-party settlement in Namibia. 
In this context I want to say a particular word about 
South Africa. There is now a real prospect that the 
conflicts on South Africa's borders, in Rhodesia and 
Namibia, will shortly be ended. This, combined with 
welcome initiatives on South African domestic policies, 
offer a chance to defuse a regional crisis which was 
potentially of the utmost gravity, and to make progress 
towards an ending of the i solation of South Af rica i n -world 
affairs ." (Italics mine)32 
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The Ceasefire . and the February 1980 Elections 
I 
candidates, 
By mid-morning the queue outside Harare's main 
polling station stretches for a quarter of a mile. 
In rural areas the first light of dawn reveals 
lines of peasant voters extending to two or three 
hundred metres. The contrast with last year's 'internal' 
election is striking - the carnival staged to prove that 
'your African' had no sympathy for 'external terrorists' 
now yields to a definite demonstration of the popular will. 
Down the ranks of voters sweeps wave after wave of jubilant 
crowing and strutting in honour of ZANU PF's symbolic cock. 
Grim-faced white police reservists recoil into mute gloom. 
A truckload of black soldiers from the Rhodesian African 
Rifles proceeds up Jameson Avenue crowing deliriously. 
White shoppers avert their eyes. Mugabe, secure in the 
countrysid.e, has clearly s·tonned Muzorewa' s urre.n ·stronghold - within 
hours the Bishop will declare the elections a fraud and white citizens 
will deliver themselves to yet another day of prayer. 33 
In spite of British harassment of PF candidates, largely ZANU 
in spite of a strong South African military presence and 
secret funding by both South African itnerests and multinational 
capital, ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, captured 62.992% of the 
vote and 57 seats in the 100 member House of Assembly; ZAPU, 
campaigning as the Patriotic Front, gained 24.113% of the 
vote and 20 seats. The reaction of Zimbabwe's white community 
was like that of Britain's Prime Minister, stunned (the latter 
in fact was so stunned that it took three days before she 
could send a congratulatory telegram to the Prime Minister 
elect). 
But what made it possible? Why was the Patriotic Front 
given such a decisive mandate from the Zimbabwean electorate. 
Some of the answer to that question lies in the fact that 
the people voted for the forces who they knew could end the 
war because they recognized "the Boys" and only the Boys as 
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the people who had conducted the war, who as well had parti-
cipated with them in the war. Another dimension of the answer 
' to that question, however, lies in the very manner in which 
the British and their allies attempted to stage manage the 
final production. It is to this effort - consisting of the 
manner in which the ceasefire and the election were carried 
out - which I would like now to address myself. 
Under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreements Lord 
Soames was responsible for both the maintenance of the cease-fire 
arrangements and the administration of the elections. One 
aspect of the cease-fire arrangements was placing the PF guerillas 
in 16 designated assembly places, each assigned a 17 man team 
of Commonwealth troops. As of January 15, a month before the 
elections, approximately 20,860 guerillas, 3/4 of which were 
ZANU, had gathered at the assembly points. With a few excep-
tions the Commonwealth observer teams were impressed with the 
orderliness and discipline characterizing the PF forces. 
A key stipulation of the Lancaster House Agreements was 
that all parties were to be confined to assembly areas. But 
Lord Soames only minimally monitored, however, the auxiliary 
forces, called variously "The Spear of the Nation" or "The 
Eye of the Nation", loyal largely to Bishop Muzorewa and 
numbering 25 ·, 000. Between November and the end of January 
15,000 extra black auxiliaries were hired from among the 
unemployed youth in the cities and country-side by the Muzorewa 
• 
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administration. The Rhodesian government in the beginning 
of December increased its defence budget an extra 19% to meet 
' accompanying costs like the training of these auxiliaries by 
regular Rhodesian army counter insurgency experts and mercenaries. 
It was these forces, the auxiliaries who, it was anticipated, 
would be the force to turn the village population away from 
supporting the PF contenders. As a British journalist reported 
from Salisbury in late November: 
There is no doubt that the Auxiliaries will be deployed 
in 'bases' throughout the country in an effort to 
counter the presence of PF guerrillas who are now 
hiding weapons and moving into villages throughout 
the country. · 34 
So too did Soames fail to regulate the various white units 
of the Rhodesian security forces such as the Rhodesian air 
force or the Selous Scouts. Indeed, rather than curtailing 
the mobility of the units of the Rhodesian colonial army, 
Soames consistently ordered units like the Rhodesian Light 
Infantry regiment into action on his behalf against groups of 
guerrillas alleged - sometimes by the very same Rhodesian 
security forces - to have violated the cease-fire accords. 35 
It is important that we recall that the activities of the 
various Rhodesian forces set loose by the policies and actions 
of the British governor were not confined to going after well-armed 
guerrillas in the bush, "evening the score", as the Rhodesian soldiers 
often described it. The objective was to intimidate the masses. By 
election time it was clear that most of the assassination 
attempts, the bombings and the shootings - many aimed at any 
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and all black faces anywhere present - were the -work of such notorious 
groups as the 1600 strong tracker and dirty tricks unit known 
as the Selous Scouts. In February · after a series of vicious 
incidents including the bomb destruction of a Catholic missionary 
press in Gwelo and finding the bodies of two Selous Scouts - one 
black and one white - in an exploded car, enough international 
attention was mobilized to cause a steep reduction in the ·violent 
acts by the Rhodesian incumbent forces. But it took a threat to 
break diplomatic relations with Britain by President Julius Nzerere 
to get any serious response to the problem from the Thatcher 
administration. 
On January 13 Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere told 
a group of party and government leaders in a speech in Dar es Salaam: 
There must be someone to tell them the truth, just like 
the child in the story of the emperor's new clothes who · 
told the truth, because sensible people would not say any-
thing. Sensible people would not tell the British that 
they are killing and that they are collaborating with 
South Africa and that they are conspiring with Rhodesia and 
that they are conspiring with Boers from two places, 
Rhodesia and South Africa, to kill our young men. But 
sensible people would not say anything. A fool must be 
found to tell them this. 
Therefore yesterday I complained to them. I wrote to the 
British Prime Minister, telling her this was not what was 
expected of them in Rhodesia and ... we still expect the 
British to change their ways. 
It wasn't the first time the question of the South African 
presence had been raised. On January 11, 1980, Nyerere on 
behalf of the Frontline States had formally protested that the 
South African presence in Rhodesia was a violation of the 
settlement terms. The issue involved more, he said, than the 
• 
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so-called Beit Bridge question - where South Africa had maintained 
300 troops on the Rhodesian side of the bridge. (Beit Bridge is 
on the Limpopo River border between Rhodesia and South Africa.) 
, 
There remained the question of additional troops and that of 
South African aircraft and pilots yet in Rhodesia. Particularly 
vexing was the question of South Africans in Rhodesian army 
uniforms. An American ex-Rhodesian mercenary, William Atkins, 
had stated in December that "South Af'rica maintains as many as two 
combat battallions of paratroopers and at least one squadron of 
Mirage fighter bombers in Zimbabwe Rhodesia". He further claimed 
. 
that "70% of Salisbury's paratroopers were trained in South 
Africa, mainly at Bloemfontein". 36 Further, Colin Legum in 
The Observer (January 20, 1980) had alleged that Lord Soames, 
with the authorization of Lord Carrington had entered into a 
secret agreement with Pretoria. 
Possibly no area of Lord Soames administration of Zimbabwe was 
so revealing as was his handling of the South Africa question. 
Throughout his four months in Zimbabwe he was confronted with 
the question of why the British tolerated the South AFrican 
presence. It was an accusation which even the U.S. administration 
candidly conceded was an accurate one. 37 Just as consistently 
Soames or his spokespersons would deny the South African presence 
as being any greater than the "small unit stationed with the 
Governor's approval at Beit Bridge."* 
*On March 11, 1980 British credibility received yet another nail 
in its coffin when it was revealed. that "at least four companies of 
South African troops together with at least two airborne units and 
their equipment had returned to South Africa in the previous 56 hours.'' 
Clearly, their purpose had been to remain in the country preparatory 
to a South African military action against the new Mugabe govenlffier1t. , 
A key question remains: how much did Britain ' s allies know about and cooperat e wi th 
this? Was it a replay of Angola in 1975-76 when the ~lest, especially the USA, 
hired South Africa as the "hatchet squad?" See arcong other articles: Bloom, 
Bridget "South African Forces Withdrawing from Rhodesia", Financial Tirnes(London) 
Tuesday, Saturday, March 1, 1980; "Pretoria Hawks Plan for Contingency of 
Rhodesia Intervention", The Times (London) Thursday, February -21, 198@. 
• 
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Another controversial area was Lord Soames' administration 
of the elections procedure. The Governor and his office by 
delaying on the determination of a repatriation date made the 
, 
return of th~ 250,000-odd Zimbabwean refugees ~rom Mozambique -
the majority ZANU supporters - by election time difficult, it not 
impossible. (At the same time, on January 28 the Soames adminis-
tration provided an RAF Hercules for 62 dissident former Mugabe 
party members released by the Mozambican government.) Further, by 
declining to limit financing of any one party, the Governor 
fa~ili tated_ Muzorew_a' s _ UANC~ s abili~ to attract. heavy fo:i;e~gn 
financing (British industrialists alone raised $220,000 for 
Muzorewa's April 79 election effort (Financial Times, December 
20, 1979). The South African government is said to have donated 
enough secret funding to Muzorewa so as to buy one million votes 
easily! Both the Rhodesian Press and tpe government broadcas~i~q 
services, the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Broadcasting Corp., chaired by 
William Bassen (also chairman of the British American Tobacco 
Company), also opt~d in favour of the Muzorewa forces. News 
commentaries consistently termed the PF "an external terrorist 
alliance". This pattern of bias prompted former Prime Minister 
Garfield Todd to unsuccessfully request that the Foreign Office 
remove the Rhodesian staff and substitute BBC personnel. But 
Soames and company turned a blind eye. In the meanwhile, trans-
portation was a critical question especially since February 
was the wettest month of the Rhodesian rainy reason. The Soames 
administration conveniently permitted the Muzorewa forces to 
hire so many of the private buses - Over 800 - that the Commonwealth 
monitoring force itself was often unable to get transport to move 
the guerillas from their initial "rendez-vous points" to the 
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"assembly areas". Consistently, the Soames administration 
attempted to curtail the ability of ZANU especially to 
; 
mobilize its supporters. When on January 27, a reliably estimated 
crowd of 500,000 people gathered at the Highfield township near 
Salisbury to hear Robert Mugabe speak, police and auxiliaries 
stopped many busloads from attending, turning them back towards 
the countryside. This action was related to regular interventions 
by security forces at the Governor• s instructions to prevent 
ZANU campaign materials and Chartered British and Dutch planes 
carrying medical supplies from ZANU support groups from landing 
in either Salisbury or Bulawayo. 
Because of the pattern of clear abuses and violations by the 
British administration, like some of those catalogued above, 
Quentin Peel writing in the Financial Times (London) of 
January 8, 1980, observed: 
... the biggest danger to the visible impartiality of the 
British exercise lies in its adoption of the entire 
~: machinery of theRhodesian Government, with only a 
skeleton staff under Lord Soames to monitor it. That 
machinery, both civil service and police, is deeply 
committed to the retention of the status-quo and therefore 
to the promotion of Bishop Muzorewa's UANC. 
The final report of the Commonwealth observers team, 
unanimouly adopted by the members from India, Canada, Nigeria, 
Australia, Ghana, Barbados, Sierra Leon~, Bangladesh, Jamaica, 
Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, included the observations that 
"Intimidation [by the guerrilla forces] had been substantially 
exaggerated" and that: 
the election campaign was characterized by a number of 
aberrations from the conditions envisaged by the 
Lancaster House Agreements. Most serious was the 
failure of the Administration to treat the political 
parties on an equal footing.38 
j 
v 
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It is true that there were structural limitations, e.g. 
a white civil service adamantly opposed to black rule, a highly 
developed colonial economy, these aspects would have imposed 
themselv·es on any effort for constructing a just cease fire 
and fair election. But it is equally clear that the latter were 
. never the objectives of the Lancaster House exercise. What 
was intended was optimally to prevent the empowerment of the 
Zimbabwean liberation movement, but at minimum to mold the political 
and economic directions which that blossoming might assume.* 
What ensued was that the Zimbabwean people in a free and fair 
election united behind being tired of war and wanting their sons 
** and daughters to return home. 
*It is also clear that Britain would pay any price to do this. 
, 
** 
- . . 
' ' 
' , 
On 12 March previous British and South African denials were 
negated when the SA Prime Minister Mr. P.W. Botha issued 
a statement confirming that SA troops had been present in 
Rhodesia during the pre-election period and were not 
being withdrawn. The text of the statement read: "The 
British authorities were aware of the presence of South 
African men and equipment with the Rhodesian forces, 
particularly with the view to facilitating the arrange-
ments for the holding of orderly elections. Immediately 
after the elections, I announced that this assist~nce was 
being withdrawn". (BBC 21.3.80) 
• 
HERITAGE OF WAR 
Figures estimated with the help of relief 
workers indicate that one in every four 
Zimbabweans was killed, injured, dis-
possessed or displaced from his/ her 
home during the war. 
Estimates are: 
Killed: 
Injured: 
Displaced persons: 
Refugees: 
In protected villages: 
Lost their homes: 
Total: 
27,500 
275,000 
750,000 
225,000 
225,000 
330,000 
1,832,000 
, 
('Refugees' refers to those that have 
fled to the front I ine states; 'displaced 
persons' .to those that have become 
squatters in Salisbury and other urban 
areas.) 
(Source: International Defence 
and Aid Fund, FOCUS, 
• 
An estimated 500,000 young people 
have missed years of education and are 
without work, money or prospects 
April 1900; page 9) 
• 
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A Forward Look -
The most difficult hours for Zimbabwe lie yet ahead. Facing 
the new Mugabe-led administration are a set of problems as 
difficult as those ever faced by any newly independent country 
anywhere in Africa. A major problem is that of land re-distribution . 
Consistently, the PF has said that the current circumstances wherein 
some 6,682 white farms each have about 100 times more land than 
some 675,000 farms in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's) 39 will 
be the first major issue they will tackle. Thus, the Mugabe 
administration must address itself .to this problem at a grave 
point wherein most of the agricultural output in the economy 
comes from the white farms. And the transportation net work is 
so arranged as to largely service the white farms. In 1976 white 
owned farms with nearly a fifth of the black population living 
on them produced four-fifths of Rhodesia's agricultural output. 
(The Times, April 18, 1980). 
Edison Zvobgo, Zimbabwe's new Minister of Local Government 
and Housing, identified another problem - an economic one -
when in an address to the African Chamber of Commerce in Salisbury, 
he stated that "until we control our own natural resources and 
pulse and breath of our economy, we remain only puppets." But 
in effect Dr. Zvobgo was speaking to two interrelated problems, 
one being gaining control of the economy, the other being the 
role of whites in the future Zimbabwean society. To control the 
economy Zimbabweans, black and white ones as well, will have to 
assume many of the jobs now held by a white community that will 
, 
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leave (and as in Guinea, Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, will 
destroy everything) before it shares its position with any blacks -
or more frightening yet, joins in the destruction of that very 
, 
system of class privilege so carefully nutured into being. With 
each move made by ZANU the party, by the Mugabe administration, to 
gain those jobs, there will be one more white who will get ready 
to pull up stakes and turn Southwards or to other parts of the 
world where white skin and colonial privilege remains intact. 
Already the tensions are mounting around this problem. And 
at the time of writing (May 1980) some 35% of the key officers 
in the army, some 200 white senior civil servants, among them seven 
permanent secretaries, and some 1365 white police officers are 
all expected to leave within the next six months.40 In the 
meanwhile on May 19, the Manpower Minister, Mr. Edgar Tekere, 
probably "riding point" for the entire Mugabe administration, but 
aware of a high rate of black unemployment, announced his 
intention to dismiss thousands of white civil servants because 
* 41 they were over retirement age and were already drawing pensions. 
The whole matter of how the Mugabe administration will treat 
the army is another entire article. It is an ongoing saga which 
take take some time to resolve. The work to be done in simply 
integrating the various Rhodesian units with the guerrilla forces 
*Whether Tekere said, as Reuters claims, "They must realize that 
I'm the boss, not them ... I'm not afraid of the conflict with them," 
remains to be demonstrated, What is definitely true, though, is 
that Reuters has a long and distinguished background of distorting 
and taking out of context statements made by government leaders in 
Angola and Mozambique. Also, often those writing for the wire 
services in Southern Africa have been themselves far too fond of 
the pleasures of colonial privilege, the sundowners, the swimming 
pools and the servants with the house, to be able to write as 
"objective" journalists. For more information on this question the 
reader is referred to a short but excellent narration of how news 
is covered in Rhodesia and South Africa, done by the British National 
Union of Journalists (NUJ) called Journalists: Repression and Truth 
in Southern Africa, 1978, 20pp. 
• 
Postscript - 18 
is immense. But integrating two sets of men - one including 
some of the world's most v.icious mercenaries - who have been 
fighting each other for 15 years 1s yet another story: One 
bold and imaginative attempt to treat the internal tensions 
surrounding the army question and at the same time aid Mozambique 
in its campaign to end armed hostilities against it is Mugabe's 
recent decision to send members of the white Rhodesian Light 
Infantry into action against the Mozambique dissidents (called 
Mozambique Naional Resistance, MNR) who have been using Rhodesia 
as their staging point and base area. It is a bold mov·e by 
Mugabe especially since there are strong ''kith and kin'', war 
buddy linkages between the white Rhodesian security forces and 
the Mozambican dissidents, many of the latter being either 
mercenaries, white Rhodesians, or white South Africans. 
The bulk of the b1ozambique dissidents are of course either African 
or Portuguese but many of them have served either in the Rhodesian, 
South African or Portuguese colonial armies. On this see (among 
others AAM, Fire Force Exposed, op cit., MacManus, James, 
''Mugabe Orders White Infantry Action'', The Guardian (London), 
May 26, 1980.) 
In all these areas there lies the potential for disruption 
and sabotage by external forces. As with the economic problem 
of a salaried sector too long starved by low wages and a galloping 
14.5% inflation rate, the Zimbabwean race relations antagonisms 
provide an excellent terrain for planting mines. Indeed recent 
indications are that the South African government policy is to 
do just that. The Guardian (London) of April 25, 1980 quotes 
• 
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a white Rhodesian civil servant as saying, "South Africa's 
whole policy towards Zimbabwe seems to be to encourage the 
departure of whites, whatever their profession." 
Add to all the above a sketch of the social situation, i.e., 
health services, educational possibilities, housing and what 
emerges is a portrait of an ideal society for the colons but 
a desperately vulnerable independent polity. Recent Roman Catholic 
Church studies and other research for instance, show the following: 
- out of 1,200,000 African children who started primary 
school education between 1959 and 1966 only 3,000 were 
able to complete secondary schooling; 
- the doctor patient ratio for European is 1 - 830 (not 
too far short of Britain) whereas for Africans in the 
rural areas it is 1 - 100,000; 
- Salisbury hospitals which serve 8.7% of the population 
receive 29.7% of the total health budget; 42 
- As of 1969, 2.8 million Africans in the TTL~ occupied 
440,000 dwellings with a total of 1.30 million rooms. 
There was an average of 6 persons per dwelling and at 
least two persons per room. Of the 873,200 private dwellings 
occupied by Africahs in the provinces, districts and 
main urban centers, 91% were without electricity and the 
majority were built of traditional materials other than 
bricks, concrete or asbestos. 43 * 
But above all it is in the juncture of free Zimbabwe inheriting 
an economy 70% in foreign hands, 44 and also one needing a minimum 
of $5.0 billion dollars in aid during its first five years of 
existence that I find that most perilous and slippery footing. 
*There is in addition a significant amount of class differentiation 
within the Zimbabwean African community. The form and intensity 
of class struggle within Zimbabwe may be one of the most critical 
questions of the future. It is not, however, within the purview 
of the present paper. The reader is referred, however, to some 
of the excellent work done on this question by scholars at the 
African Studies Center, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 
Mozambique. Additionally, John Saul early raised some stirring ques-
tion about the class composition of the Zimbabwean liberation move -
ment itself. See his recent book, The State and Revolution in 
Eastern Africa, Monthly Review Press (1979). 
• 
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For already the Trilateralist West has begun to manipulate the 
destiny of Zimbabwe by steadily reducing the amounts of aid they 
will give or by delivering that aid through mechanisms known 
for their delay and inefficiency. One British newspaper recently 
pointed out that 10% of the four year £75 million British aid 
program will be administered through the European Development 
Fund - known to many as "the slowest spending fund in the world 11 • 45 
The USA is again the Trilateralist Deputy in this regard, too. 
In fact the parallel slowness and paltriness of various Western 
aid donors to the new Republic makes one wonder is there is a 
concious, coordinated policy at work, namely management of the 
newly liberated country, stymmying a kind of domino-like radicali-
zation of other areas by keeping Zimbabwe in a desperately poor 
economic circumstance. As the Washington correspondent of the 
Financial Times (London) commented: 
The economic aid which the Carter administration is 
now prepared to give $27 million in 1980-81 which would 
be also shared with neighbouring countries like Zambia 
and Mozambique hit hard by the long civil war - is re-
latively modest compared to the $1 billion of US aid 
that was considered a couple of years ago under the 
abortive (Kissinger-Ford initiated) Anglo-American Plan. 46 
Why such a feeble sum? The Carter administration, admitting 
that the new Salisbury officials yet had not understood their 
reasoning, explained that the "Administration line is now that 
it makes sense to spread US aid around the other African regions, 
because in the long term Zimbabwe should emerge as one of the 
strongest economies in the area. 47 
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on the positive side 
Several recent events and dynamics/also should be summarized 
before closing. The first is that the recent (Spring 1980) 
Lusaka meeting and the Arusha Conference last year demonstrate 
clearly that the Southern African countries have their "total 
strategy'' just as does Prime Minister Botha and his Trilateralist 
triends. Part of the total strategy of the liberated countries 
of Southern Africa is to coalesce into a functioning and unified 
regional entity, one capable of countering the present economic 
• 
stranglehold Boer South Africa maintains upon the region. Secondly, 
Zimbabwe is a state where a lot of planning has already been done. 
Much of that planning was shaped by political directions coming 
from ZANLA people then still in the bush. Thus that planning is rooted 
in Zimbabwean realities, not the conjecturing fantasies of Western 
Trilateralist so-called "scholars". 
Finally, just as the process of political unifcation between 
ZANU and ZAPU continues to unfold (a process which necessarily has 
been long and will continue to be long and perhaps even more costly), 
so, too, today do the Zimbabwean people learn afresh new forms of 
political struggle; daily they absorb new conceptions of a rebuilt 
Zimbabwean society. 
Through the years the Zimbabwean cadre have demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to assimilate the revolutionary experiences of 
other peoples. The ZANU of 1980 is long removed from the small 
collection of individuals who used to be "the office" near Uhuru 
Road in Dar Es Salaam. 
In the UNCTAD document previously cited it is written in a 
concluding chapter: 
The new government of Zimbabwe cannot afford to repeat these 
errors because its people have suffered enough tragedy, and 
• 
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for too long, in their struggle for political emancipation. 
To avoid a repetition of such errors, the groundwork for 
long-term development should be clearly established soon 
after independence, even as t ~e new nation grapples with 
the immediate problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
A clear definition of long-term development objectives -
of the direction in which the society is to move - will 
promote a greater understanding among ordinary citizens of 
the realities of the economic situation in the period of 
transition, and of the sacrifices that may be needed at 
all levels to sustain economic expansion in the future.49 
This is indicative of the flexibility and skills, I think, 
of the Zimbabwean liberation people at large. The authors also 
were probably reflecting on one of the writings of their 
Mozambican comrade-in-arms Samora Machel who said in 1975, when 
then discussing the future of his then newly independent country: 
The State is not an eternal and immutable structure; the 
State is not the bureaucratic machinery of civil servants, 
nor something abstract, nor a mere technical apparatus. 
The State is always the organized form through which a 
class takes power to fulfill its interests. The colonial 
State, an instrument of domination and exploitation by a 
foreign bourgeoisie and imperialism which has already been 
partially destroyed by the struggle, must be replaced by 
a people's State, forged through an alliance of workers and 
peasants, guided by FRELIMO and defended by the People's 
Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, a State which wipes 
out exploitation and releases the creative initiative of 
the masses and the productive forces. 
In the phase of people's democracy in which we are now 
engaged as a phase of the Mozambican revolutionary process, 
our aim is to lay the material, ideological, administrative 
and social foundations of our State. We need to be aware 
that the apparatus we are now inheriting is, in its nature, 
composition and methods, a profoundly retrograde and reactionary 
structure which has to be completely revolutionized in order 
to put it at the service of the masses ... The new battle is 
only beginning. 50 
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